The National Transportation Safety Board released its findings on a fatal Bel Air house explosion in 2024, saying the situation was entirely preventable.
A house on Arthurs Woods Drive exploded around 6:48 a.m. on Aug. 11, 2024, killing the homeowner and a contractor and injuring three others while also damaging neighboring homes.
The NTSB’s overall finding is no single issue caused the blast, but rather that it was the result of several communication failures at Baltimore Gas and Electric and its parent company, Exelon.
NTSB: Cause of the explosion
According to the agency’s newly released report obtained by WBAL-TV 11 News, an underground electrical fault caused the explosion, but the cause of the deaths was BGE’s ineffective response to the initial gas leak.
| REPORT: Read the NTSB’s findings (PDF)
The NTSB said a delayed response contributed to the blast. The report also noted the home did not have natural gas alarms inside.
The NTSB cited National Electric Safety Code as recommending a 12-inch separation between utilities to prevent damage from arcing, leaks or maintenance operations.
According to the NTSB’s report, the gas pipe and the electrical service lines were in a common trench and that an excavation of the trench showed the two utilities were located between 3-15 inches apart at various points.
“This indicates that, after the explosion, there were some areas where the utilities had less than 12 inches of separation, the minimum Exelon required between gas and electric utilities in common trenches,” the NTSB report states.
NTSB: Communication issues
The report indicates the initial gas leak was reported around 8:30 p.m. the night before by a passerby, but no specific address was given. Instead, a nearby intersection was reported.
A gas dispatcher who responded to the passerby’s report told an electric dispatcher that a gas technician was en route, giving the address of the nearby home. The NTSB report said a gas dispatcher did not send a gas technician to investigate the suspected natural gas leak at the accident home.
As part of the investigation, the gas dispatcher told the NTSB that the electric dispatcher provided the same intersection from the passerby as the location where the electric technician had smelled natural gas odorant.
“However, the NTSB’s review of Exelon’s electric-dispatcher call logs showed that the electric dispatcher had provided the accident home address, which was 0.2 miles away, as the location of the report; the gas dispatcher had not recorded the correct address of the electric dispatcher’s report of the suspected natural gas leak,” the NTSB report says.
Two other attempts were made to reach BGE before the explosion, the report finds.
The report found that issues within BGE’s call center were also to blame, saying an employee fell asleep at his desk and admitted to drinking alcohol.
“The accident call-center agent told the NTSB that he had been drinking alcohol before his unscheduled shift and that he had fallen asleep at his desk. Because Exelon did not submit the accident call-center agent for drug and alcohol testing, the NTSB could not determine whether drug or alcohol impairment was a factor in the accident,” the NTSB report says.
BGE has since made several policy changes as a result, including 24/7 monitoring of gas leak calls, increased dispatcher training and a fitness-of-duty screening for call-center employees.
BGE statement
BGE sent a statement to WBAL-TV 11 News in response to the NTSB report, saying:
“Our hearts remain with the family, loved ones, and all those impacted by the tragic explosion in Bel Air on Aug. 11, 2024.
“Safety is our highest responsibility, and we appreciate the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) thorough review of this incident.
“The NTSB’s final report identified a breakdown in how information about a suspected gas leak was communicated and acted upon across multiple functions of our organization. BGE had procedures in place intended to ensure suspected gas leaks were promptly escalated and investigated. In this case, those procedures were not followed as intended, resulting in missed opportunities to identify and address the hazard before the incident occurred.
“After a nearly two-year investigation, the NTSB offered no recommendations for improvements to BGE’s policies and procedures, and instead cited the actions BGE has proactively taken to enhance operations across its gas, electric, and customer operations divisions. The NTSB found no systemic safety issues with BGE’s natural gas system.
“While no action can undo the devastating loss caused by this tragedy, we are committed to learning from it and continuously improving our systems, processes, and safety culture. Our focus remains on protecting our customers, employees, contractors, and the communities we serve every day.”
NTSB timeline of events
Saturday, Aug. 10, 2024
7:36 p.m.
“The accident homeowner’s real estate agent reported to Exelon (through an Exelon app) a power outage at the accident home.”
7:51 p.m.
“Exelon dispatched an electric technician to the area near the accident home to investigate the power outage.”
8:27 p.m.
“A passerby in the accident neighborhood reported to Exelon (through its call center) the smell of natural gas odorant. The passerby provided the intersection closest to her as the location where she had smelled natural gas odorant, and then Exelon’s system identified the home at 2314 Arthurs Woods Drive (a nearby home), the home closest to the intersection, a home about 0.2 miles south of the accident home, as the location of the report.”
8:34-8:39 p.m.
“The electric technician diagnosed an electrical fault near the accident home and referred the repair to an electric contractor. The electric technician also smelled natural gas odorant at the accident home. After reporting the smell to an electric dispatcher, he closed the job and left the scene.”
8:41 p.m.
“Exelon dispatched a gas technician to the nearby home to investigate the suspected natural gas leak.”
8:59 p.m.
“An electric dispatcher notified a gas dispatcher of the suspected natural gas leak at the accident home. The gas dispatcher told the electric dispatcher that a gas technician was on the way to the area (to the nearby home) but did not redirect the gas technician from the nearby home to the accident home or send a different gas technician to investigate the suspected leak at the accident home.”
9:08 p.m.
“The gas technician investigated the suspected natural gas leak at the nearby home, reported to gas dispatch that he did not find a leak there, and left the scene. He did not investigate the leak at the accident home (0.2 miles away) because he was not aware of the suspected leak at that location.”
Sunday, Aug. 11, 2024
6:08 a.m.
“A county worker that was working at the accident home smelled natural gas odorant and heard sounds of gas hissing. He tried to report what he suspected was a natural gas leak to Exelon (through its call center) but did not reach a responsive call-center agent, even after multiple attempts.”
6:16 a.m.
“As he was leaving the scene, the county worker notified his supervisor of the strong smell of natural gas odorant at the accident home and the sounds of gas hissing. He told his supervisor that he had been unable to reach Exelon through its call center.”
6:22 a.m.
“The county worker’s supervisor reported to Exelon (through its call center) the smell of natural gas odorant and the sounds of gas hissing at the accident home.”
6:48 a.m.
“The accident home exploded.”
7:12 a.m.
“A gas technician (not the same gas technician who investigated the suspected natural gas leak at the nearby home) arrived at the accident home and began Exelon’s emergency response to the explosion.”
The NTSB conducted an investigation because it has jurisdiction over the gas lines.
